Gaming Out the Descent Into Autocracy, Part 1
Trump is clear about his intention to become an autocrat. Here's why—and how—he might be able to do it.
The weeks since Trump’s victory have seen a never-ending succession of postmortems on the Democrats and their supposed failures. When not musing about all that the party got wrong, the commentariat is reckoning with what Trump’s reelection says about the America we thought we knew.
These topics are surely important. But there is a more pressing issue that has received far less attention: Can Trump, who has clearly and repeatedly declared his intention to become a dictator, actually succeed in doing so?
After all, post-hoc analyses of the party’s mistakes are worth precisely nothing unless it gets a chance to correct them in future elections. But will Democrats be allowed to run in these elections, much less prevail? Will they be free to campaign without facing crippling repression? Will we continue to have the same civil liberties we enjoy today?
The answers to these questions are far from obvious.
That Trump intends to rule as an autocrat is beyond dispute. If you believe that he and his backers do not want to prosecute their opponents, strip rights from entire categories of people, deport millions without due process, and crush protests with military force, your argument is not with me; it is with them, since they are the ones who said it.
The question, then, is not whether they will try to impose authoritarianism. They have told us they will. Rather, it is how far they will be able to go.
In How Democracies Die, political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt identify three imperatives that any aspiring autocrat must fulfill in order to roll back democracy.
The first is to “capture the referees,” or the state bodies empowered to “investigate and punish wrongdoing by both public officials and private citizens." These consist of the courts, law-enforcement, intelligence organs, and any agencies responsible for taxation and regulation. The second is to sideline—through bribery, coercion, or other means—any actor capable of opposing the ruler. Potential sources of resistance include the media, civil society, business leaders, opposition parties, and dissenters in the ruling party. The third task is to rewrite the rules to the leader’s advantage.
But this time is different. First, Trump and his team have learned from their mistakes. Second, he has brow-beaten, cajoled, and purged the GOP into far greater subservience than before. Finally, and most importantly, the Supreme Court has given him the green light to commit crimes with impunity
Despite his best efforts, Trump was unable achieve any of these goals during his first term in office. His bid to capture the referees was stymied by his own justice department, where top officials refused to investigate his opponents and instead appointed a special counsel to investigate him. In addition, while electoral rules in many states already worked to benefit him and his party, he could not move them further in that direction.
But this time is different. First, Trump and his team have learned from their mistakes. Second, he has brow-beaten, cajoled, and purged the GOP into far greater subservience than before. Finally, and most importantly, the Supreme Court has given him the green light to commit crimes with impunity (more on that later). As a result, there are precious few obstacles in his way.
This does not mean he will have a free hand, however. Some key impediments remain that will make the road to autocracy difficult to traverse. Hence, it is worth examining the path of least resistance by identifying the potential hindrances he will face and the weak points he might exploit.
This series, and the conclusions therein, should not be read as a prediction. It is rather a stress-test of sorts. I examine the prevailing makeup of America’s political system—the actors, their stated goals, and the various means at their disposal to achieve these goals. I then ask how far, given these conditions, a committed authoritarian can go in dismantling democracy.
The coming conflict over American democracy is the most pivotal the country has experienced since the Civil War and Reconstruction. But the outcome is too dependent on human idiosyncrasy to predict—chiefly, the competence, or lack thereof, of Trump and his conspirators. These are not, to put it mildly, the sharpest tools in the box. Whether they will successfully wield the powers they have is largely up to them. All I can do is lay out what those powers are along with the extent to which they would permit a capable ruler to bring down the republic.
Next time, we will consider Levitsky and Ziblatt’s three imperatives along with Trump’s chances of achieving them. The outlook, unfortunately, is grim. But it is not preordained, and there are ways to avert it.
Other entries in this series:
I retain cautious optimism that Trump will not become a dictator. He is getting increasingly old and is restrained by term limits that he will not be able to get rid of. It is also worth noting that Republicans' down ballot performance has been underwhelming to say the least, with the party set to get a very narrow House majority that will not make governing easy.